9/11/21 / Afghanistan thread

1) Seems pretty clear that after all the time and money spent in Afghanistan, not to mention the lives lost weren't able to get Afghanistan strong enough to stand on its own two feet (if only for a little while) - another 20 years and more billions of dollars and soldiers won't make a difference.
2) I'm eager to see all the members of Congress and the Senate willing to draft articles of war in Afghanistan, rather than trying to make political hay out of it. The truth is, Congress has NEVER authorized military action in Afghanistan. Those that were in office TWENTY years ago, approved a one paragraph piece of legislation allowing the President to do what they wished in the fight against terrorism.
3) The was a serious botch by the Biden Administration. I really have to believe the Pentagon had a better plan for the pullout. This reminds me of trying to get away on vacation. Oh, crud - forgot to water the plants. Oops - did I bring my swim trunks? Leave the stove on?
4) Maybe there is no graceful way to exit a country after 20 years of military occupation.

 

There was no good way to exit Afghanistan — history has shown us there never is. After all, it’s one of the two great mistakes.

From the Washington Post story I posted earlier on the politics thread, exploring what happened after Trump’s much-ballyhooed Doha agreement 18 months ago:

KABUL — The spectacular collapse of Afghanistan’s military that allowed Taliban fighters to reach the gates of Kabul on Sunday despite twenty years of training and billions of dollars in American aid began with a series of deals brokered in rural villages between the militant group and some of the Afghan government’s lowest-ranking officials.

The deals, initially offered early last year, were often described by Afghan officials as cease-fires, but Taliban leaders were in fact offering money in exchange for government forces to hand over their weapons, according to an Afghan officer and a U.S. official.

Over the next year and a half, the meetings advanced to the district level and then rapidly on to provincial capitals, culminating in a breathtaking series of negotiated surrenders by government forces, according to interviews with more than a dozen Afghan officers, police, special operations troops and other soldiers. …

The Taliban capitalized on the uncertainty caused by the February 2020 agreement reached in Doha, Qatar, between the militant group and the United States calling for a full American withdrawal from Afghanistan. Some Afghan forces realized they would soon no longer be able to count on American air power and other crucial battlefield support and grew receptive to the Taliban’s approaches.

“Some just wanted the money,” an Afghan special forces officer said of those who first agreed to meet with the Taliban. But others saw the U.S. commitment to a full withdrawal as an “assurance” that the militants would return to power in Afghanistan and wanted to secure their place on the winning side, he said. The officer spoke on the condition of anonymity because he, like others in this report, were not authorized to disclose information to the press.

The Doha agreement, designed to bring an end to the war in Afghanistan, instead left many Afghan forces demoralized, bringing into stark relief the corrupt impulses of many Afghan officials and their tenuous loyalty to the country’s central government. Some police officers complained that they had not been paid in six months or more.

“They saw that document as the end,” the officer said, referring to the majority of Afghans aligned with the government. “The day the deal was signed we saw the change. Everyone was just looking out for himself. It was like [the United States] left us to fail.”

The negotiated surrenders to the Taliban slowly gained pace in the months following the Doha deal, according to a U.S. official and an Afghan officer. Then, after President Biden announced in April that U.S. forces would withdraw from Afghanistan this summer without conditions, the capitulations began to snowball.

As the militants expanded their control, government-held districts increasingly fell without a fight. Kunduz, the first key city overrun by the militants, was captured a week ago. Days of negotiations mediated by tribal elders resulted in a surrender deal that handed over the last government- controlled base to the Taliban. …

The Afghan military’s fight against the Taliban has involved several capable and motivated elite units. But they were often dispatched to provide backup for less-well-trained army and police units that have repeatedly folded under Taliban pressure.

An Afghan special forces officer stationed in Kandahar who had been assigned to protect a critical border crossing recalled being ordered by a commander to surrender. “We want to fight! If we surrender, the Taliban will kill us,” the special forces officer said.

“Don’t fire a single shot,” the commander told them as the Taliban swarmed the area, the officer later recounted. The border police surrendered immediately, leaving the special forces unit on its own. A second officer confirmed his colleague’s recollection of the events.

Unwilling to surrender or fight outmatched, the members of the unit put down their weapons, changed into civilian clothing and fled their post.

“I feel ashamed of what I’ve done,” said the first officer. But, he said, if he hadn’t fled, “I would have been sold to the Taliban by my own government.”

When an Afghan police officer was asked about his force’s apparent lack of motivation, he explained that they haven’t been getting their salaries. Several Afghan police officers on the front lines in Kandahar before the city fell said they hadn’t been paid in six to nine months. Taliban payoffs have become ever more enticing.

“Without the United States, there was no fear of being caught for corruption. It brought out the traitors from within our military,” said one Afghan police officer.

Several officers with the Kandahar police force said corruption was more to blame for the collapse than incompetence. “Honestly, I don’t think it can be fixed. I think they need something completely new,” said Ahmadullah Kandahari, an officer in Kandahar’s police force.

In the days leading up to Kandahar’s capture this month, the toll on the police had become visible. Bacha, a 34-year-old police commander, had been steadily retreating for more than three months. He had grown hunched and his attire more ragged. In an interview, he said the repeated retreats had bruised his pride — but it was going without pay that made him feel desperate.

“Last time I saw you, the Taliban was offering $150 for anyone from the government to surrender and join them,” he told a reporter as the interview drew to a close. “Do you know, what is the price now?”

He didn’t laugh, and several of his men leaned forward, eager to hear the answer.​

What we’re seeing today is as inevitable as wind. The only reason any American forces were in Afghanistan at all was because the Biden administration delayed the Doha agreement’s May pullout four months to Sept. 11, 2021, for the symbolism.

We should have dropped a nuke into bin Laden’s Tora Bora cave in 2001, then wiped out the rest of his forces and gotten out by 2005.

 

There was no good exit to be had.

1. The American regular army footprint is so heavy, it’s cheaper just to buy new shit instead of paying for the logistics to carry out 20 years of gear.

2. Our departure was always going to cause a power vacuum. After 20 years, the Afghan government was still incapable of filling that void, so the Taliban did.

 

Korea. Vietnam. Iran. Lebanon. Somalia. Iraq. Afghanistan. Libya.

Lather, rinse, repeat.

The United States military LOVES to play Army (war, not the football team). Except none of those bright military minds have any idea how to finish the game.

 

We haven't attempted to win a conflict since 1945.

 

Re, No. 4: See Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, the British Empire, the Soviet Union and now the U.S. Doesn't anyone read a history book any more?

 

The British tabloids are slamming the U.S. and Biden.
Ummmmmm, just because the U.S. is pulling out doesn't mean YOUR country isn't free to stay.

 

The way to win a war is to mobilize totally. We haven't done that since World War II. Instead we expect a relatively small volunteer force to deploy over and over again. I feel bad for those veterans who had to carry the weight for these ill-advised adventures.

I was thrilled that the draft was abolished in 1973, mainly because it kept me out of the service while we played out a losing hand in Vietnam. But in retrospect, I think general conscription (with no deferments for the privileged) is a good thing. It would ensure that the wars we fight are justifiable, or at least politically popular.

 

I mean we would have won in Korea if the damn Chinese army didn’t invade. That wasn’t lack of trying.

 

And since the British had their own failed ventures in Afghanistan in 1838, 1878 and 1919, they can jolly well piss off.

 

UN forces were there a couple of months before China intervened and a couple of years after.